View Single Post
  #7  
Old 05-24-2005, 12:49 PM
bebopp7's Avatar
bebopp7 bebopp7 is offline
Registered User
 

Join Date: Dec 2002
Location: Fairborn, Ohio
Posts: 605
Thanks: 0
Thanked 7 Times in 4 Posts
Default continued

Prisoners, James Crawford’s separation of powers claim has already been
validated by an Ohio appellate court.114 Like the issues raised in Plyler and Death
Row Prisoners, James Crawford’s problem requires both remedies; (1) declaratory
and injunctive relief preventing the Parole Board from considering core questions
of guilt or innocence and substituting its judgment for an Article IV trial court's
verdict in the future and, (2) immediate release for inmates victimized by this
Parole Board practice because it resulted in an ultra vires sentence which is void.
There is a pivotal difference between Plyler, Death Row Prisoners and
James Crawford's plight which separates these cases from the garden variety claim
typically swallowed up by a habeas prayer under the authority of Preiser. In Plyler,
Death Row Prisoners and James Crawford’s case, the remedy afforded by § 1983
and the remedy afforded by habeas are constituent ingredients embedded in the
same case or controversy for Article III purposes. This accounts for their inherent
consistency. While § 1983 establishes a right to relief, it does not grant a complete
remedy. While habeas affords complete relief, it is not designed and equipped to
establish the factual predicate necessary for engaging its surgical and restricted
remedy. Standing alone, each statute is impotent. The quality of being indigenous
to the same case or controversy necessitates merging these statues to achieve relief.
114 Document No. 262, Exhibit A, Ankrom, Slip Opinion at p. 30.
45
One Year Jurisdictional Limitation for Filing Habeas Corpus Claims
In 1996, a one year statute of limitations was imposed upon habeas motions
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.115 There are four prongs to
this one year statue of limitation. None of the Plaintiffs before this Court are
challenging their stale state court judgments or sentences. The first prong does not
apply.116 Similarly, the 2nd and 4th prongs do not apply.117 However, the facts of this
case fit very comfortably within the 3rd prong, “the date on which the constitutional
right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases
on collateral review.”118 Two requirements must be satisfied to engage this
provision. First, we must establish the date when a new constitutional right was
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court and, of course, our acting within one year of
this date. Second, we must prove that these ultra vires Parole Board sentences are
subject to collateral attack by way of this New Constitutional Rule.
The 1st Ohio Appellate District initially concluded that Blakely would not
115 See 28 U.S.C. 2244 (d) (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.
116 See 28 U.S.C. 2244 (d) (1) (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
117 See 28 U.S.C. 2244 (d) (1) (B) the date an impediment to filing an application created by State
action is removed, and (D) the date when factual predicate of the claim presented could have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
118 See 28 U.S.C. 2244 (d)(1)(C) Although the New Constitutional Rule relies upon the 6th
Amendment Right to jury trial, its impact is felt in the distribution of powers between the Judiciary,
which is limited, and the jury, which is expanded. A separation of powers theory could also be used.
46
materially affect Ohio’s sentencing scheme.119 The term prescribed statutory
maximum sentence, as clarified in Blakely, was deemed to be synonymous with
Ohio’s statutory range. After the Booker decision was released, Ohio’s 1st
Appellate District admitted that it was wrong.
“The prescribed statutory maximum sentence is not the maximum
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the
maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”120
[Internal quotation marks deleted.]
Accordingly, the trigger for a renewed one year limitation period under the
3rd prong is January 12, 2005, the date when Booker was decided.121
When a Supreme Court decision "results in a 'new rule,' that rule applies to
all criminal cases still pending on direct review." 122 A case announces a new rule
"if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final."123 As previously explained, the decisions rendered by
Ohio’s Parole Board are ultra vires and void. Because these sentencing decisions
are not legally binding, they are always deemed pending and ripe to be challenged.
119 See State v. Eckstein, 1st Oh. App. Dist. No. C-030139, 2004 – Ohio – 5059, Appendix to
Plaintiffs’ Brief on Blakely Issues, Part I – Supplemental Brief, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 3; The reasoning
behind this position was that Ohio’s sentencing scheme did not permit a sentencing court to deviate
from a prescribed range of sentences for any felony. On this basis, Ohio’s sentencing guidelines
were distinguished from guidelines employed by Washington State in Blakely.
120 State v. Bruce, First Ohio Appellate Dist., No. C-040421 (Feb. 4, 2005), slip opinion at p. 4, see
Appendix to Plaintiffs’ Brief on Blakely Issues, Part I – Supplemental Brief, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4.
121 If Blakely is deemed to be the relevant trigger, Plaintiffs are still filing this action in a timely
manner, as Blakely was decided on June 25, 2004, which is still within the year required.
122 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522 (2004)
123 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2549 (2004).
47
The Exhaustion Requirement
Both the U.S. Congress and Supreme Court require exhaustion of state
remedies before engaging the federal habeas corpus statute.124 The Supreme Court's
exhaustion requirement is based upon the doctrine of comity.125 Before a state
prisoner can engage habeas corpus, they must first demonstrate that they have
exhausted "remedies available in the courts of the state, or (B) (i) there is an
absence of available state corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render
such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant."126 [Emphasis added.]
Named Plaintiffs present the unusual case where there is both an absence of
state remedies to exhaust and the process which does exist is ineffective to protect
the rights of petitioners. We begin with the first cardinal canon for interpreting a
state's statute. A court must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says. When the words of a statute are
unambiguous, this first canon is also the last. Judicial inquiry is complete.
124 For Supreme Court authority, see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). The U.S. Congressional
authority, see 28 U.S.C. 2254 (b).
125 The doctrine of comity stipulates that one court should defer action on causes properly within
its jurisdiction until courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers and already cognizant
of the litigation have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.” See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509, at 514 (1982).
126 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b).
48
The authority for releasing an inmate on parole is set forth below in R.C. §
2967.03.
"The adult parole authority may exercise its functions and duties in
relation to the pardon, commutation, or reprieve of a convict upon the
direction of the governor or upon its own initiative, and in relation to the
parole of a prisoner eligible for parole, upon the initiative of the head of
the institution where the prisoner is confined, or upon its own initiative.
When a prisoner becomes eligible for parole, the head of the institution
in which such prisoner is confined shall notify the authority in the
manner prescribed by the authority. The authority may investigate and
examine, or cause the investigation and examination of, prisoners
confined in state correctional institutions concerning their conduct
therein, their mental and moral qualities and characteristics, their
knowledge of a trade or profession, their former means of livelihood,
their family relationships and any other matters affecting their fitness to
be at liberty without being a threat to society..."127
There is no mention of the Judiciary and no right to appeal an adverse parole
decision in this statute. Ohio Administrative Code § 5120:1-1-07 completes R.C. §
2967.03, providing the mechanism for granting a parole. This rule states:
“(A) An inmate may be released on or about the date of his
eligibility for release, unless the parole board, acting pursuant to rule
5120:1-1-10 of the Administrative Code, determines that he should
not be released on such date for one or more of the following
reasons:” 128 [Emphasis added.]
Again, the judiciary has been excluded. Ohio’s Parole Board exercises
exclusive jurisdiction over granting and revoking paroles. R.C. § 2967.15 states:
(B) …prior to the revocation by the adult parole authority of a
person's pardon, parole, transitional control, or other release and prior
127 R.C. § 2967.03
128 Ohio Admin. Code § 5120:1-1-07 (A)
49
to the imposition by the parole board or adult parole authority of a
new prison term as a post release control sanction for a person, the
adult parole authority shall grant the person a hearing in accordance
with rules adopted by the department of rehabilitation and correction
under Chapter 119 of the Revised Code…." 129 [Emphasis added.]
Finally, Policy No. 501-36130 governing implementation of the parole
guidelines provides no option for challenging an adverse parole decision in court.
The message from Ohio's legislature is clear and unambiguous. The
judiciary has been deliberately excluded from the administration of Ohio's post
conviction parole process.131 This eliminates any concerns about comity. Since
Ohio courts have never been vested with jurisdiction over parole matters, there are
no parallel proceedings, and there can be no concerns about claim preclusion.
Inadequate Relief through Judicial Review
There is nothing in Ohio's Code conferring any authority upon an Ohio court
to order a parole. Even Ohio's Supreme Court is powerless to order an inmate
paroled. On December 18, 2002, Ohio's high court tried. In its Layne decision, the
Ohio Supreme Court noted that Mr. Houston should have served 10 to 15 years.132
129 R.C. § 2967.15 (B).
130 See Document 47, Defendants Appendix to Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants' Item B,
ODRC Policy 501-36.
131 See also Plaintiffs' Original Complaint, Paragraph 114(a), stating "matters of parole are solely
under the jurisdiction of the Ohio Parole Board and even the Governor has no legal authority to
intervene in the decisions of the Ohio Parole Board." See also, Document No. 1, Plaintiff Exhibit
26, Letter from Margarette Ghee to Mary Ann Amato and Plaintiff Exhibit 27 consisting of two
letters from Heather Reed, Assistant Deputy Legal Counsel to Governor Taft, concurring with Ms.
Ghee, stating that the Governor has no legal authority to intervene in a Parole Board decision.
132 This was actually an error. Gerald Houston’s true guideline was 84 to 120 months [7 – 10 years].
50
At the time of deciding Layne, he had served 20 years and 10 months.133 Reflecting
the urgency of this matter, Allen County Judge Warren ordered the Parole Board to
conduct a new hearing for Mr. Houston consistent with Layne the next month. The
Parole Board waited until May 20, 2003 before giving Mr. Houston another
hearing. Instead of rendering a decision consistent with Layne, Parole Board
Member Bedra simply placed Mr. Houston in his proper guideline – Category 9
requiring at most 120 months after Mr. Houston had served 257 months. No future
hearing was scheduled and no indication was given as to when, if ever, Houston
could be paroled at this May, 2003 hearing.134 On March 22, 2004, 14 months after
Layne, Mr. Houston was finally paroled.
The Layne decision engaged declaratory relief. In a perfect world, we
expect subjects of a declaratory judgment to do as they have been ordered. Gerald
Houston is living, breathing proof that the Parole Board, the subject of the Layne
decision, is not perfect. Severing the bond between the offense score and guideline
range upon which the Layne decision has been built – as Board Member Bedra did
by placing Houston in category 9 requiring at most 120 months when 257 months
had been served and then continuing Houston indefinitely – is more proof of
imperfection. In practice, Layne's declaratory relief has proven to be inadequate.
The judiciary has been excluded from the statute and from the administrative
133 See Layne, 97 Ohio St. 3d at 460.
134 See Document No. 203, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 61, affidavit and exhibits of Gerald Houston.
51
rule granting paroles, as well as from the policy governing the granting of paroles.
Ohio's judiciary has also been excluded from the statute dictating the revocation of
paroles. The Judiciary has been given no right to exercise judicial review, because
there is no right to appeal either an adverse parole decision or the revocation of a
parole. Finally, the inability of Ohio’s Supreme Court to even order an inmate
paroled, further confirms the absence of a proper corrective process for wrongfully
denying paroles, revoking paroles and conducting judicial review of parole denials.
Inadequate Relief through Administrative Appeals
Ohio inmates can appeal a parole decision by seeking reconsideration from
the Parole Board's Quality Assurance Group.135 To engage this review, an inmate
must prove the existence of new information or information not previously
considered.136 These are formidable hurdles. Ohio inmates are not allowed access
to their parole file. It is impossible to ascertain what is new or has not been
considered, without discovering what the Parole Board knows. The essence of a
135 See Document 47, Defendants Appendix to Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants' Item C,
ODRC Policy 501-38. This policy is now referenced as ODRC Policy No. 105-PBD-04. [See
Document No. 209, Plaintiffs Exhibit 135, Reconsideration of Parole # 105-PBD-04]. Policy No.
501-38 is virtually identical to 105-PBD-04. See also Letters from Hearing Officer E.M. Colan to
Craig Davis and Clyde Cannell, dated February 16, 2005, Appendix to Plaintiffs’ Brief on Blakely
Issues, Part I - Supplemental Brief, Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 10 and 11, attesting to the stunted review
permitted. Copies have been sent to opposing counsel for authentication.
136 See Policy No. 501-38, Part VI Procedure, B; 105-PBD-04 Part VI, Procedure, B. "The request
for reconsideration must be based on, and specifically refer to, relevant and significant NEW
information that was either no available or not considered at the time of the hearing or a request for
a reconsideration must specifically allege that a correction should be made in the application of the
parole release guidelines." [NEW appears in all caps in the text of this policy.]
52
reconsideration hearing – determining whether a result has been decided
incorrectly upon existing information – has been deliberately omitted from the
Quality Assurance Group's sphere of inquiry. The converse of this mission
statement doubles as irrefutable proof of an absence of corrective process. The role
of Quality Assurance rests upon the premise that every panel decision is correct.
Members of the Parole Board’s Quality Assurance Group are analysts,
hearing officers and occasionally Parole Board Members. Authors of quality
assurance letters can be participants on parole panels. In essence, they are passing
upon the work of their peers. The entire decision-making framework for applying
guidelines initially and challenging these guidelines once applied is determined by
the same group of decision-makers. The author of a Quality Assurance Review
letter cannot be neutral or detached because, once an inmate has been held beyond
their guideline, there is a substantial incentive to vindicate this lengthy detention
due to similar decisions rendered by the reviewer upon virtually identical and
legally indistinguishable facts. Invariably, reconsideration letters are perfunctory
approvals of the original decision. This stunted and insular review process attests
and confirms the existence of circumstances rendering such corrective process
ineffective to protect the rights of a petitioning inmate.
Inadequate Judicial Oversight of Parole Board Operations
In its Wilkinson brief to the Supreme Court, Ohio's Attorney General stated
53
that inmates have two court avenues for contesting an adverse parole decision, (1)
declaratory judgment and (2) mandamus.137 These options are both illusory.
Support for the premise that Ohio inmates have two avenues into an Ohio
court to contest their parole decision relies chiefly upon a 1994 Ohio Supreme
Court decision Hattie v. Anderson.138 Like the constricted administrative appeal
just discussed, Hattie incorporates equally severe restraints. Hattie stipulates that
the Ohio statute (i.e. R.C. § 2967.03) conferring authority to grant a parole "creates
no expectancy of parole or a constitutional liberty interest sufficient to establish a
right of procedural due process."139 This threshold hurdle shrinks the avenue down
to a sidewalk. Next, before engaging declaratory relief, Hattie further requires a
showing that application of the parole guidelines violates Ohio's Constitution.140
This narrows our sidewalk to a taped stripe.141 These hurdles; (1) overcoming the
threshold question of no expectancy of parole and no right to procedural due
process and, (2) raising an issue of constitutional proportions, renders the
Declaratory Judgment route hollow for all but the most skilled pro se litigators.
Under the Ohio Supreme Court’s Hattie decision, inmates have been granted
the right to challenge the constitutionality of their parole proceeding, but they
137 Brief for Petitioner Reginald Wilkinson , Case No. 03-287, at p. 10 (dated July 19, 2004), see
Appendix to Plaintiffs’ Brief on Blakely Issues, Part I – Supplemental Brief, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1
138 Hattie v. Anderson, 626 N.E.2d 67 (Oh. 1994) [hereafter Hattie].
139 Hattie, 626 N.E.2d at 69.
140 Hattie, 626 N.E.2d at 71.
141 Demonstrating this difficulty, the current Parole Guidelines went into effect on March 1, 1998. It
took 4 years and 9 months – until Layne – to satisfy this formula and challenge these rules.
54
cannot challenge the result, and they cannot secure relief from any particular
finding. This explains why Gerald Houston sat in prison for 14 months after his
parole proceeding was clearly found to be unconstitutional. In other words, the
utility of an inmate’s challenge will be limited to the benefit conferred upon a law
professor, as they instruct students on intricacies of Ohio’s constitutional law.
Hattie demonstrates both an absence of available state corrective process and how
the process which does exist is ineffective to protect the rights of petitioners.
To rebut these hard truths, the State will no doubt produce an astronomical
number of inmate cases seeking relief through Ohio courts. The real story lies in
the number of lawsuits dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. With only a few exceptions, this net snares
all of them. The fate of William Dotson and Rogerico Johnson went the route of
Rule 12(b)(6). At the end of the day, we must return to the language in Ohio
statutes and rules. Inmates have been given no remedies through Ohio courts.
The remedy of mandamus is also discussed in Hattie.142 In practice, Parole
Board discretion totally blockades the mandamus avenue. Inmates should not be
required to pursue conjectural remedies – such as mandamus – when these
complaints are destined to become vain acts. As Justice Rutledge once stated, 143
"The exhaustion of state remedies rule should not be stretched to
142 Hattie, 626 N.E.2d at 70.
143 Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
55
the absurdity of requiring the exhaustion of … separate remedies when
at the outset a petitioner cannot intelligently select the proper way, and
in conclusion he may find only that none of the alternatives is
appropriate or effective."144
Substantive Prerequisite – the Unreasonable Application Clause
James Crawford is challenging the authority of the Parole Board to
contemplate core questions of guilt or innocence and to substitute its judgment for
the verdict of an Article IV Ohio court, resulting in a new sentence with an upward
departure from the standard range of time required for his crime. Mr. Crawford is
further challenging the manner in which he has been prosecuted, judged and
sentenced for new criminal behavior, because it has not been done the right way.
These substantive legal issues have all been addressed in Brey, Layne and Ankrom.
According to these Ohio cases, these practices are prohibited and Mr. Crawford
should not be in prison. Unfortunately, Mr. Crawford is still very much in prison –
because the Parole Board insists upon exercising its ultra vires authority.
The core issue beneath both of Mr. Crawford’s claims has been identified
and championed by Ohio's Attorney General. In the Attorney General's opinion,
Ohio's Parole Board has been given the right to exercise sentencing authority.
"The decisions under attack here – Parole Board decisions
determining that the Respondents should serve specified periods of
time in prison before again being considered for release – are
144 Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. at 568.
56
sentencing decisions. Ohio law recognizes parole decisions as such,
and this Court also understands parole in that manner.
"Under Ohio law, sentencing authority is divided between the
court and the Adult Parole Authority ("APA"). After conviction, the
courts set the minimum and maximum terms of any prison sentences.
Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St. 3d 504, 511, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000 Oh.).
"But … for as long as parole has existed in Ohio, the executive branch
(the APA and its predecessors) has had absolute discretion over that
portion of an offender's sentence between those termini. Id. at 512. 145
While Ohio's Supreme Court has tried to restrain Parole Board discretion,
Mr. Crawford, as well as Greg Hunsaker, Dennis McCoy, Michael Dennis, Edward
Fadgen and thousands of additional Plaintiffs bear living witness to the fact that
these decisions are not followed, and do not appear to be amenable to enforcement.
There is either an absence of corrective authority or an absence of will to apply the
law or both. Regardless, denial and ineptitude cannot excuse unlawful exercise of
authority, particularly when conduct results in detention contrary to federal law.
The Parole Board's sentencing authority must be analyzed in light of 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d), which reads as follows:
An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in
State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
145 See Wilkinson v. Dotson, Brief for Petitioner Reginald Wilkinson to the U.S. Supreme Court,
Case No. 03-287, at p. 20 (dated July 19, 2004), Appendix to Plaintiffs’ Brief on Blakely Issues,
Part I – Supplemental Brief, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1.
57
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, when the state
court identifies the correct governing legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but
unreasonably applies it to the facts of a particular case, or" when the state court either
unreasonably extends a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new
context where it would not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a
new context where it should apply."146 The unreasonable application clause
"requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. The state
court's application of a clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable."147
In our case, the Parole Board has refused to extend the principal that any fact
that can prolong the duration of a prison sentence must be acknowledged in a plea
or found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury to a new context where it
should apply. Specifically, the Parole Board must be guided by the same rule now
governing Ohio courts. Only facts found to be true by the jury or contained in the
plea can be used as a basis for assigning time. The Parole Board's current
guidelines are conflicted beyond repair with this current reading of the Sixth
146 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000).
147 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2000).
58
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Nevertheless, the Parole Board remains
steadfast in its insistence to apply these guidelines and use them to dictate the fates
of Old Law Ohio inmates. This conduct is more than incorrect of erroneous.
Continuing adherence to these parole guidelines is objectively unreasonable.
The exercise of Ohio Parole Board authority in Mr. Crawford's case and
thousands of others similarly situated cannot be reconciled with the New
Constitutional Rule developed in Booker, Blakely and its progeny. At the same
time, there is clearly an absence of corrective authority in Ohio to put this agency
back on its track. These Plaintiffs are currently trapped in an ultra vires and illegal
sentence, with only one hope for redemption. This case speaks to the very essence
and meaning of the writ of habeas corpus, for it was ingrained by our founders into
the U.S. Constitution for specifically this purpose.
Conclusion
In a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the
judiciary for a person's imprisonment. These Defendants have lost their way. On
occasion, this happens. We held citizens of Japanese descent in relocation centers
during World War II. In 1833, South Carolina felt entitled to imprison any person
acting on behalf of the federal government. The Great Writ has not been called "the
59
most celebrated writ in the English law" 148 for naught. It is there to rescue our
society from the tyranny of zealots as well as men with good intentions but
mistaken notions of justice.
Entering and serving every day of a guideline range in the current parole
guidelines is no minor matter. When compared to minimum sentences set by trial
courts, these guideline ranges are pitched high. To understand how high, in 534 out
of 600 clients surveyed, the average trial court minimum sentence was 6.4 years.149
These Plaintiffs had to serve another 5.3 years just to reach the entry point of the
guideline range matching their conviction. This condition was exacerbated by the
widespread use of upward departures. To illustrate, these same 600 Plaintiffs had
to serve another 8.9 years just to enter their assigned guideline range. 150 Typically,
Plaintiffs were placed near the high end or at a mid-point in their guideline range
before receiving a hearing. In 526 out of 600 cases, after serving on average 6.1
years to reach their initial hearing, these plaintiffs had to serve another 12.4 years
or 18.5 years in all before they could receive a meaningful release hearing.151 But
even this was insufficient. To appease the Parole Board's voracious appetite for
vengeance, thousands of Ohio inmates have served every day of their guideline
148 3 Blackstone Commentaries 129.
149 See Document No. 196, Plaintiffs' Exhibits, Charts and Graphs, Chart I, and Document No. 172,
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Separation of Powers and Memorandum in Support, at
footnotes 35 to 42 and accompanying text.
150 See Document No. 196, Plaintiffs' Exhibits, Charts and Graphs, Chart II.
151 See Document No. 196, Plaintiffs' Exhibits, Charts and Graphs, Chart III.
60
range, and years beyond. The Parole Board has no one to blame for this
predicament but itself. This problem has been festering ever since 1995.
Under Ohio's Old Law, the maximum sentence acted as a deterrent. Nobody
expected an inmate to literally serve this much time. The current Parole Guidelines
were designed to render the minimum sentence a vain act, and make the maximum
sentence the only sentence. Since 1998, they have been succeeding. The Great Writ
needs to be dusted off and put to work. Restoring the Judiciary to its rightful place
and checking the usurpation of authority by administrators is precisely the kind of
work envisioned by this Country's Founders for the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs add this Supplemental Brief to our
Rule 56 (c) Motion, in support of our Rule 15(d) Supplemental Complaint.
Respectfully submitted by
/s/ Norman L. Sirak
_____________________
Norman L. Sirak #0038058
75 Public Square, Suite 800
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Phone (216) 781 2550
Fax (216) 781-6688
Peter Wagner #0034083
5th 3rd Center -14th Floor
608 Madison Ave.
Toledo, Ohio 43604
Phone (419) 242 1400

Certificate of Service
A copy of the foregoing has been sent via the electronic filing system and
via U.S. mail to the Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Litigation Section,
to the attention of Phillip King, Esq. and Scott Campbell, Esq., at 140 East Town
Street, 14th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215, this 24th day of May, 2005.
/s/ Norman L. Sirak
By _________________
Norman Sirak
__________________
"Those who deny freedom to others, deserve it not for themselves; and, under a just God, can not long retain it."
Reply With Quote