View Full Version : Sentenced to Willard


Paralegal USA
08-12-2009, 09:29 AM
Several members have contacted me recently with questions about how long the State has to transfer an inmate to Willard following sentence to such or a final parole revocation determination committing a violator to the Willard program.

The following case, a habeas filed in the Seneca County Supreme Court, determines those time lines pursuant to statute and regulatory authority. I've taken the liberty of bolding the areas of the decision most applicable.

******************************************



STATE, N.Y. EX REL. RYNIEC v. WILLARD DRUG TREAT. CAMP, 05B0079 (4-27-2006)

2006 NY Slip Op 50765(U)

THE STATE OF NEW YORK, EX REL. PAUL RYNIEC, Petitioner v. WILLARD DRUG

TREATMENT CAMPUS and THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,

Respondents.

05B0079.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Seneca County.

Decided April 27, 2006.


[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

W. PATRICK FALVEY, J.

This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 24, 2006
directing the above-named Respondent Superintendent of Willard
Drug Treatment Campus to produce the body of Paul Ryniec, the
Petitioner, before this court this on the 27th day of April,
2006.

The Petitioner appeared pro se, and the Respondent appeared by
Emil J. Bove, Jr., Assistant Attorney General. The court has
reviewed the petition and the return, and heard oral
presentation. Based upon the same, the Court finds that the
Petitioner was revoked and restored to parole supervision,
following a final parole revocation hearing held on November 23,
2005. Such restoration was subject to the Petitioner's successful
completion of the Willard Drug Treatment program. He was
thereafter transferred to the custody of DOCS at the Wende
Facility Reception Center on January 27, 2006, and transferred to
Willard on February 22, 2006.

Judge Bender ofhis Court has held that a reasonable period of
time must be afforded to DOCS to transfer parolees. The
Respondent argues that the requirement found in CPL 410.91 (http://www.loislaw.com/pns/doclink.htp?dockey=2671255@NYCODE&alias=NYCODE&cite=410.91+Crim.+Proc.) to
transfer an inmate forthwith to a State reception center, and
thereafter to Willard, within ten(10) days of a judicial
sentence to a "Willard parole", does not apply. The Court agrees
that a transfer in the present situation is not mandated by the
statute, but finds that it is a legislative indicator of what a
reasonable time frame is to transfer a parole violator who has
been revoked and restored to parole supervision, subject to
successful completion of the Willard program. The undersigned now
rules that inmates who are in such a situation are mandated to be
transported to the state reception center "forthwith" (CPL 410.91 (http://www.loislaw.com/pns/doclink.htp?dockey=2671255@NYCODE&alias=NYCODE&cite=410.91+Crim.+Proc.)
& CPL 430.20 (http://www.loislaw.com/pns/doclink.htp?dockey=11426842@NYCODE&alias=NYCODE&cite=430.20+Crim.+Proc.)) and this Court interprets that to mean within
ten (10) days. Ayers v. Coughlin, 72 NY2d 346 (http://www.loislaw.com/pns/doclink.htp?alias=NYAPP&cite=72+N.Y.2d+346) (1988). Thereafter,
the parolee should be received by Willard within ten (10) days
after he is admitted to the State reception center. Thus, the
parolee should be received by Willard within twenty (20) days of
his final parole revocation determination.

Here the record is totally devoid of any explanation for why 91
days passed before transfer to the Willard Campus occurred. This
Court finds in accordance with prior rulings in People ex. Rel.
Ortiz v. Poole, 11 Misc 3d 1064 (http://www.loislaw.com/pns/doclink.htp?alias=NYMISC&cite=11+Misc.3d+1064) (A)(2006) and People ex. Rel.
Davis v. Superintendent, Willard Drug Treatment Campus,
2006 WL 852085(2006) that the Petitioner has been and is detained in
violation of his constitutional rights to due process. It is
accordingly

ORDERED, that the Petitioner shall be released and restored to
community based parole supervision forthwith, which the Court
interprets to mean within ten (10) days hereof.